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Abstract—The Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a
complex language, and consequently, XML-based protocols are
susceptible to entire classes of implicit and explicit security
problems. Message formats in XML-based protocols are usually
specified in XML Schema, and as a first-line defense, schema
validation should reject malformed input. However, extension
points in most protocol specifications break validation. Exten-
sion points are wildcards and considered best practice for loose
composition, but they also enable an attacker to add unchecked
content in a document, e.g., for a signature wrapping attack.
This paper introduces datatyped XML visibly pushdown
automata (dXVPAs) as language representation for mixed-
content XML and presents an incremental learner that infers
a dXVPA from example documents. The learner generalizes
XML types and datatypes in terms of automaton states and
transitions, and an inferred dXVPA converges to a good-enough
approximation of the true language. The automaton is free
from extension points and capable of stream validation, e.g.,
as an anomaly detector for XML-based protocols. For dealing
with adversarial training data, two scenarios of poisoning are
considered: a poisoning attack is either uncovered at a later
time or remains hidden. Unlearning can therefore remove an
identified poisoning attack from a dXVPA, and sanitization
trims low-frequent states and transitions to get rid of hidden
attacks. All algorithms have been evaluated in four scenarios,
including a web service implemented in Apache Axis2 and
Apache Rampart, where attacks have been simulated. In all
scenarios, the learned automaton had zero false positives and
outperformed traditional schema validation.
Keywords-XML, grammatical inference, visibly pushdown
automata, stream validation, anomaly detection, experimental
evaluation.
I. Introduction
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) [1] is ubiqui-
tous in electronic communication, e.g., the Simple Object
Access Protocol (SOAP), the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP), the Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML), and many data serialization formats. The
success of XML boils down to its rich data models and tool
support: Instead of specifying some protocol from scratch, a
software developer can simply define a subset of XML and
reuse existing parsing and querying tools.
XML attacks, in particular, the signature wrapping at-
tack [2], have motivated this work. The signature wrapping
attack exploits identity constraints and best practices for
composition in XML Schema (XSD) [3], and the attack’s
goal is to modify a document without violating a crypto-
graphic signature. Several high-value targets were vulnerable
over the years, e.g., the Amazon EC2 cloud control SOAP
interface [4] and many SAML frameworks [5]. Attack tool
support is already available [6], and fixing the problem tends
to be hard [7]–[10]. Signature wrapping is a showcase for
language-theoretic security because it is the result of design
choices. A document with references is logically not a tree
but often wrongly treated as such in modular software, and
the need for determinism in composed schemas has led to
extension points in many specifications as attack enablers.
This paper extends a previous grammatical inference ap-
proach, where a language representation is learned from ex-
ample documents [11]. Use cases for the presented approach
are anomaly detection in XML-based protocols and schema
inference for interface hardening. The contributions are
automaton models as language representations for mixed-
content XML, algorithms for datatype inference from texts,
an incremental learner, and an experimental evaluation.
For representing event streams of mixed-content XML,
the proposed datatyped XML visibly pushdown automata
(dXVPAs) and character-data XVPAs (cXVPAs) introduce
transitions for text contents in the original XVPA definition
by Kumar et al. [12]. The proposed learner converges to a
good-enough language approximation in terms of a dXVPA.
An inferred automaton for stream validation mitigates the
signature wrapping attack because it is free from extension
points. Counting the mind changes between incremental
steps is a heuristic for measuring convergence in the learning
progress. Furthermore, the learner has been designed with
poisoning attacks in mind. Two scenarios are considered:
a successful poisoning attack is uncovered at some later
time and a poisoning attack stays hidden but is statistically
rare [13]. For the first case, the learner provides an un-
learning operation, and for the second case, a sanitization
operation trims low-frequent states and transitions from
an automaton. All algorithms have been implemented and
evaluated in four scenarios, where various XML attacks are
simulated: two synthetic and two realistic scenarios utilizing
Apache Axis2 and Rampart. In all scenarios, the learned
automaton outperformed baseline schema validation.
A. XML
XML specifies a syntax: open- and close-tags for ele-
ments, attributes, namespaces, allowed characters for text
content and attribute values, processing instructions for the
parser, inline Document Type Definitions (DTD) [1], and
comments. The syntax allows ambiguities, e.g., an element
without text content, and XML Information Set [14] there-
fore defines a data model to remove syntactic ambiguities:
A document has an infoset if it is well formed and all
namespace constraints are satisfied.
Business logic accesses infoset items in a document
through an interface. Common APIs for XML can be dis-
tinguished into (a) stream based, e.g., Simple API for XML
(SAX) and Streaming API for XML (StAX) [15] and (b)
tree based, e.g., a Document Object Tree (DOM).
A schema is basically a grammar, and the XML com-
munity provides several schema languages for specifying
production rules, e.g., DTD, XSD, Relax NG [16], and Ex-
tended DTD (EDTD) [12] as a generalization. Productions
are of form a → B, where B is a regular expression and
called content model of a. In DTD, rules are expressed
over elements. To raise expressiveness, productions in XSD,
Relax NG, and EDTD are defined over types, where every
type maps to an element. This mapping is surjective: two
types can map to the same element.
Schema validation is checking language acceptance of a
document. Typing is stricter than validation by assigning a
unique type from productions to every element [17]. The
power of regular expressions and the surjective relation
between types and elements can introduce ambiguity and
nondeterminism, but determinism is desired, e.g., for as-
signing semantics to types. DTD and XSD therefore have
syntactic restrictions to ensure deterministic typing. Schema
validation and typing are first-line defenses against attacks;
however, XML identity constraints and extension points in
XSD can render validation ineffective.
B. Language-Theoretic Vulnerabilities
The XML syntax is context free and infoset items are
tree structured, but a document is not always logically a
tree. Identity constraints like keys (ID) and key references
(IDREF, IDREFS) introduce self-references that go beyond
context freeness. Cyclic and sequential references turn a
finite tree data model logically into an infinite tree, and oper-
ations such as queries become computationally harder [18].
Furthermore, XSD introduces additional constraints (unique,
key, and keyref) over text contents, attribute values, and
combinations thereof. Checking identity constraints during
schema validation is costly because indices need to be
constructed, or the data model is traversed many times.
Also, there are two philosophies of modularity in XSD:
schema subtyping [19] by refining productions and schema
extension points using wildcards (xs:any). Extension points
allow loose coupling and are considered best practice [20].
In an XSD, a wildcard is often accompanied by the
processContents="lax" attribute which has a tremendous
effect on validation: if there is no schema in the parser’s
search space for a qualified element at an extension point,
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(b) Attack message
Figure 1. XML signature wrapping attack (reproduced from [4])
validation is skipped. By choosing a random namespace,
an attacker can place arbitrary content at an extension
point. Unfortunately, extension points are present in many
standards, e.g., SOAP, XMPP, and SAML.
C. XML Attacks
Attacks can be distinguished into parsing and semantic at-
tacks. Parsing attacks target lexical and syntactical analyses,
e.g., for Denial-of-Service. Examples are oversized tokens,
high node counts from unbounded repetitions [21], and
coercive parsing [22]. Schema validation is unable to reject
parsing attacks when they are placed at an extension point.
A special class of parsing attacks originates from inline
DOCTYPE declarations, i.e., exponential entity expansion,
external entities for privilege escalation, and server-side
request forgery (SSRF) [23].
Semantic attacks aim for misinterpretation, e.g., by tam-
pering with structure and texts. CDATA fields [22] can ex-
clude reserved characters (e.g. angled brackets) from lexical
analysis as a helper for many semantic attacks, e.g., XML,
SQL, LDAP, XPath, and command injection; path traversal;
memory corruption in interacting components; and cross-site
request forgery (XSRF) and cross-site scripting (XSS) with
respect to web applications [21].
1) Signature Wrapping Attack: Signature wrapping is
a semantic attack. XML Signature [24] specifies a
ds:signature element that holds one or more hashes of
referenced resources (i.e., elements in the document) and is
signed for authenticity. The resources are referenced by an
ID or an XPath expression. Signature checking verifies the
authenticity of the ds:signature element and compares
the stored hashes with computed ones. Checking is usually
treated as a Boolean decision, independent from the business
logic, and a vulnerability emerges when verified document
locations are not communicated between software modules
accessing the document.
In a signature wrapping attack, the referenced resource
is moved to an extension point, and a malicious element is
placed instead at the original location. An example based
on the Amazon EC2 attack [4] is shown in Figure 1. As
a precondition, the attacker needs access to some signed
document (Figure 1a). The SOAP schema has an extension
point in soap:Header, and the original message body is
hidden in a wrapper element for skipping schema validation.
The signature remains valid (Figure 1b), and the business
logic wrongly processes the attacker-provided message body.
2) Signature Wrapping Countermeasures: Security poli-
cies [2] can enforce properties of SOAP messages, but
policy checking is computationally costly. Gruschka and Ia-
cono [25] furthermore show a successful signature wrapping
attack on Amazon EC2 that satisfies security policies.
Rahaman et al. [26] propose an inline approach by adding
an element to SOAP headers that stores document charac-
teristics. Unfortunately, if a single element in the header is
not signed, the approach can also be circumvented [7].
Gajek et al. [7] and Somorovsky et al. [5] propose
improved signature verification by returning a filtered docu-
ment view, but the business logic needs to be adapted accord-
ingly. Gajek et al. [8] also propose FastXPath for location-
aware XPath-based references in signatures. Namespace
injection in XPath-based references could eventually break
this countermeasure too [9].
Jensen et al. [10] propose schema hardening by removing
extension points and restricting repetitions. Hardening is
effective because elements cannot be hidden anymore; how-
ever, all composed schemas need to be known beforehand,
and generating a single unified hardened schema is compu-
tationally hard. Experiments have also shown a significant
slowdown in schema validation.
D. Research Questions
Removal of extension points is an effective counter-
measure, but compiling a unified schema is difficult [10].
This paper therefore proposes a monitor for an XML-based
system. The monitor has a learner and validator component.
The learner component infers a dXVPA, and the validator
component utilizes an optimized variant of the automaton
to validate documents sent to the system under observation.
Validation is relative to the training data, and the approach
is therefore called language-based anomaly detection. If the
validator component rejects a document, some filtering or
extended policy checking could be performed, but these
operations are not in the scope of this work.
The assumed attacker is capable of reading and modifying
documents in transit and sending a malicious document
directly to the system under observation.
Clients and services are considered black boxes, where
message semantics are unknown to the monitor; however,
semantics are important under the language-theoretic secu-
rity threat model because an attack is basically a misinter-
pretation. When a system interprets a document, semantics
for elements and texts are derived from assigned types
and datatypes respectively, where types and datatypes are
usually defined in software (ad hoc) or in schema production
rules. Attacks affect at least one type or datatype in a
document for causing misinterpretation. The system under
observation is assumed to have type-consistent behavior:
for all manifestations of an expected type or datatype in a
document, the behavior is well specified. In other words,
language-based anomaly detection only works if attacks
are syntactically distinguishable from expected types and
datatypes. To sum up, the research questions are:
RQ1 What is a suitable language representation for types and
datatypes that is capable of stream validation?
RQ2 Can this language representation be learned?
RQ3 Can the proposed approach identify attacks?
E. Methodology
1) Language Representation: In mixed-content XML,
texts are strings over Unicode, and they are allowed between
a start- and an end-tag, an end- and a start-tag, two start-tags,
and two end-tags. XSD provides datatypes for specifying
texts, where every datatype has a value space and a lexical
space over Unicode. A language representation that captures
document structure and texts needs to be expressive with re-
spect to typing and support stream validation for open-ended
XML protocols (i.e., XMPP) and very large documents. To
answer RQ1, the paper introduces dXVPAs as an extension
of XVPAs [12]. XVPAs are known to recognize StAX event
streams for linear-time stream validation, but text contents
are not considered yet. A dXVPA introduces transitions for
datatypes of text content, and a cXVPA is an optimized
dXVPA representation for linear-time stream validation in
the validator component.
2) Learning from Positive Examples: The learner com-
ponent receives examples and computes automata for the
validation component. This learning setting corresponds to
Gold’s identification in the limit from positive examples [27],
and according to Fernau [28], the definition is as follows.
Definition 1 (Identification in the limit from positive ex-
amples [28]). Let L be a target language class that can be
characterized by a class of language-describing devices D.
E : N→ L is an enumeration of strings for a language L ∈ L,
and the examples may be in arbitrary order with possible
repetitions. Target class L is identifiable in the limit if there
exists an inductive inference machine or learner I:
• Learner I receives examples E(1), E(2), . . .
• Learner I reacts by computing a stream of hypotheses
(e.g., automata) D1, D2, . . . such that Di ∈ D.
• For every enumeration of L ∈ L, there is a convergence
point N(E) such that L = L (DN(E)) and j ≥ N(E) =⇒
D j = DN(E) .
RQ2 is answered by specifying algorithms for inferring
datatypes from text and automata from documents. Further-
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Figure 2. Incremental learning step
more, unlearning and sanitization operations for dealing with
adversarial training data are provided.
3) Experimental Evaluation: A learning-based approach
is still a heuristic and requires experimental evaluation. Four
datasets have been generated: two synthetic ones using a
stochastic XML generator and two realistic ones from a
web service implemented in Apache Axis2 and Apache
Rampart. The service has been implemented according to
best practices, and attacks have been performed manually
and automatically by the WS-Attacker [6] tool. Detection
performance, learning progress in terms of mind changes,
and the effects of unlearning and sanitization have been
analyzed to answer RQ3.
II. Grammatical Inference of XML
Figure 2 illustrates the incremental learning step. The
learner component maintains an internal visibly pushdown
automaton (VPA) A and counters ωδ, ωQ, ωF for transitions,
states, and final states. A VPA is a special pushdown
automaton with three disjoints alphabets: a call alphabet
that pushes on the stack, an internal alphabet that leaves the
stack unchanged, and a return alphabet that pops from the
stack. This concept originates from program analysis, and for
XML, the alphabets represent different kinds of events. The
set of states is implicitly the stack alphabet. For a complete
definition of VPAs, the reader is directed to Alur et al. [29].
Algorithm 3 (incWeightedVPA) receives a document
event stream E(i) and updates the VPA and the counters.
The counters are frequencies of states and transitions from
training data and necessary for unlearning and sanitization
operations. Algorithm 4 (trim) removes zero-weight states
and transitions, and Algorithm 5 (genXVPA) constructs a
minimized dXVPA. The dXVPA becomes an optimized
cXVPA for the validator component, and acceptance of
documents can then be efficiently decided.
A. Document Event Stream
Definition 2 (Document event stream). A document event
stream w is a sequence of StAX events e carrying values
lab(e). There are three kinds of events: startElement and
endElement for open- and close-tags of qualified element
names and characters for texts. Processing instructions,
comments, and entity references are ignored. Attributes are
alphabetically sorted, treated as elements with a leading
@ symbol, and mapped to a subsequence of startElement,
characters, and endElement events.
For simpler notation, a startElement event for qualified el-
ement m is denoted as m, and m is the respective endElement
event. The value of a characters event is a string over
Unicode, and nested CDATA sections are automatically
unwrapped by the parser.
XSD provides datatypes for specifying text contents. In
this work, only the lexical spaces of XSD datatypes [30] are
considered in a generalized notation of lexical datatypes.
Definition 3 (Lexical datatypes). Let T be a set of lexical
datatypes. A lexical space is a regular language over Uni-
code U, and φ : T → REG(U) assigns lexical spaces.
Lexical datatypes allow to define datatyped event streams,
where datatypes replace text contents in characters events.
Definition 4 (Datatyped event stream). A datatyped event
stream w′ is a sequence of startElement, endElement,
and characters events. The value of a characters event
e is a datatype lab(e) ∈ T . A document event stream w
corresponds to a datatyped event stream w′ if w and w′
have congruent event kinds, the qualified element names in
startElement and endElement events are the same, and text
content in a characters event in w is in the lexical space of
the congruent characters event in w′.
B. Language Representation
1) Datatyped XVPA: The dXVPAs extend XVPAs [12]
with datatypes, so they can accept datatyped event streams.
Definition 5 (dXVPA). A dXVPA A over (Σ, M, µ, T, φ) is a
tuple A = ({Qm, em, Xm, δm}m∈M ,m0, F). Σ is a set of qualified
element names, M is a set of modules (equivalent to types
in schemas), µ : M → Σ is a surjective mapping that assigns
elements to modules, T is a set of datatypes, and φ : T →
REG(U) assigns lexical spaces over Unicode.
For every module m ∈ M:
• Qm is a finite set of module states
• em ∈ Qm is the module’s single entry state
• Xm ⊆ Qm are the module’s exit states
• δm = δ
call
m ⊎ δ
int
m ⊎ δ
ret
m are module transitions
– δcallm ⊆ {qm
c/qm
−−−→ en | n ∈ µ
−1(c)}, where c is a
startElement event value that pushes qm on the
stack
– δintm ⊆ {qm
τ
−→ pm | τ ∈ T } and τ is the value of a
datatyped characters event
– δretm ⊆ {qm
c/pn
−−−→ qn | n ∈ µ−1(c)}, where c is
an endElement event value that pops pn from the
stack; the relation is deterministic, i.e., qn = q′n
whenever qm
c/pn
−−−→ qn and qm
c/pn
−−−→ q′n
e q xdealerenewcars e usedcars
e xadnew e q xadused
e
model
e
year
x x
newcars/edealer
ad/enewcars
model/eadnew model/eadnew
ad/enewcars
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q0 q f
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model/eadusedstring
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gYear, gYearMonth
newcars/edealer usedcars/qdealer ad/eusedcars
Figure 3. A dXVPA example
Module m0 ∈ M is the start module, F = Xm0 are final
states, automaton A satisfies the single-exit property [12],
and all transitions satisfy mixed-content restrictions.
The module states are implicitly a stack alphabet. Call
transitions save the current state on the stack and move to
the entry of a module. Internal transitions leave the stack
unchanged. Return transitions pop the stack and move from
an exit state to a state in the previous module.
The single-exit property ensures that every exit state in a
module has the same return transitions. Otherwise, the exit
states would behave differently depending on the saved state
on top of the stack. In XML, modules represent types, and
the language of a type must be independent from the parent
type, i.e., the calling module.
Definition 6 (Mixed-content restrictions). Datatypes are not
allowed to affect typing of elements, and the two mixed-
content restrictions must be satisfied:
• Datatype choice. A datatype choice at state qm must
lead to a single next state, i.e., if qm
τ
−→ q′m ∈ δintm and
qm
τ′
−→ q′′m ∈ δintm then q′m = q′′m.
• Datatype sequence. A return transition can only move
to a state that is not a successor of a datatype choice,
i.e., if ∃q.q
n/pm
−−−→ qm ∈ δretn then ∀q′.q′
τ
−→ qm < δintm .
The restrictions guarantee that after a characters event, a
module is either exited or another module is called because
there can never be two subsequent characters events in our
definition.
The semantics of dXVPA A are characterized by VPA
A′ = (Q, q0, {q f }, Q, δ) over the visibly pushdown alphabet
(Σ⊎T ⊎Σ) by introducing a start state q0 and final state q f :
Q = {q0, q f } ∪
⋃
m∈M
Qm
δ = {q0
µ(m0)/q0
−−−−−−→ em0 } ∪ {q
µ(m0)/q0
−−−−−−→ q f | q ∈ F} ∪
⋃
m∈M
δm
A run of A′ is denoted as (q0,⊥) w−→A (q, v), where w is
a datatyped event stream, q is the reached state, and v is
the stack. Event stream w is accepted if q = q f and v = ⊥.
Automaton A accepts language L(A) = L(A′).
Kumar et al. [12] have also shown that for every EDTD
an XVPA that accepts the same language can be constructed
and vice-versa. This theorem can be extended to dXVPAs,
but this exceeds the scope of this paper.
Example 1. Consider the following EDTD schema. The
qualified elements are Σ = {dealer, newcars, usedcars,
ad, model, year}, the types are M = {dealer, newcars,
usedcars, adnew, adused, model, year}, the start type is dealer,
and productions over types are:
d(dealer) 7→ newcars · oldcars d(newcars) 7→ ad∗new
d(usedcars) 7→ ad∗used d(adnew) 7→ model
d(adused) 7→ model · year d(model) 7→ string
d(year) 7→ gYear + gYearMonth
In XSD jargon, type model and year are simple types,
and the others are complex types. Note that element ad has
a different type depending on its context in a document.
Figure 3 illustrates the equivalent dXVPA, where states q0
and q f are added to highlight the VPA semantics. The
dXVPA modules are the types. Module model is called by
modules adnew and adused, and runs return correctly based
on the saved stack value.
2) Character-Data XVPA: A dXVPA cannot validate
document event streams efficiently. If a dXVPA is in state
pm and a characters event e encountered, the automaton can
only proceed to some state qm if there is an internal transition
pm
τ
−→ qm ∈ δintm and the event’s text content lab(e) is in the
lexical space of the datatype lab(e) ∈ φ(τ). In the worst case,
lab(e) needs to be buffered and checked for every possible
datatype. A cXVPA unifies a datatype choice between two
states into a predicate ψ ∈ Ψ, so a text needs to be checked
only once during validation.
Definition 7 (cXVPA). A cXVPA A over (Σ, M, µ,Ψ) is
a tuple A = ({Qm, em, Xm, δm}m∈M ,m0, F) and adapts the
dXVPA definition by using δintm : Qm × Ψ → Qm for
internal transitions. At most one internal transition per state
is allowed, i.e., if pm
ψi
−→ qm and pm
ψ j
−→ q′m then qm = q′m
and ψi = ψ j.
Same as for dXVPAs, the semantics and accepted lan-
guage of a cXVPA are given by the corresponding VPA over
(Σ ⊎ Ψ ⊎ Σ), where Ψ are predicates over Unicode strings.
A run on an event stream moves along an internal transition
pm
ψ
−→ qm ∈ δintm if ψ(lab(e)) holds in state pm.
Theorem 1. Every dXVPA has an equivalent cXVPA for
efficiently checking acceptance of document event streams.
To sketch the proof, the mixed-content restrictions in
dXVPAs enforce that at most one successor state is reachable
through internal transitions. A set of internal transitions is
replaced by a single predicate transition. Lexical spaces in
Definition 3 are regular languages, where union is closed. A
unified deterministic finite automaton (DFA) is constructed
to represent a predicate, and acceptance of a text can then
be decided in a single pass and linear time.
C. Datatype Inference from Text Content
Given some datatype, it is straightforward to check if texts
are within the datatype’s lexical space. But a learner only
observes texts without any datatype information. For a first
generalization from texts to datatypes, a lexical datatype
system is therefore proposed. The lexical datatype system
infers a set of minimally required datatypes for a text content
by lexical subsumption and a preference heuristic.
Definition 8 (Lexical datatype system). A lexical datatype
system is a tuple dts = (T, φ,∼s,≤s), where T and φ
are according to Definition 3. Datatypes must be lexically
distinct, i.e., φ(τ) = φ(τ′) =⇒ τ = τ′, and φ imposes
a partial ordering τ ≤lex τ′ ⇐⇒ φ(τ) ⊆ φ(τ′). With
respect to ≤lex, T always contains a unique top datatype
⊤ that accepts any string, i.e., φ(⊤) 7→ U∗. Equivalence
relation ∼s: T → K partitions datatypes into semantically
related kinds K, and ≤s is an ordering on kinds. Moreover,
the kinds impose a semantic ordering ≤′s on datatypes, i.e.,
τ ≤′s τ
′ ⇐⇒ [τ]∼s ≤s [τ′]∼s .
1) Lexical Subsumption: Figure 4 illustrates the datatype
system based on primitive and build-in XSD datatypes [30].
The standard specifies lexical spaces of datatypes as Unicode
regular expressions, and ≤lex is computed from those speci-
fications. Some datatypes are lexically indistinguishable and
are therefore not included: double =lex float, NCName =lex
ENTITY =lex ID =lex IDREF, and NMTOKENS =lex
ENTITIES =lex IDREFS. For text contents, a learner needs
to infer the least lexical space approximated by a set of
datatypes (i.e., a datatype choice).
boolean
unsignedBytebyte
language
NCName
duration
dayTimeDurationyearMonthDuration
QName
Name
NMTOKEN
token
normalizedString
string
⊤
base64Binary
gMonth
gDay
gMonthDay
gYearMonth
doubledecimal
integer
unsignedShort
unsignedInt
unsignedLong
nonNegativeInteger
short
int
long
gYear
nonPositiveInteger
negativeInteger
hexBinary
anyURI
dateTime
dateTimeStamp
time
date
positiveInteger
NMTOKENS ENTITIES
Figure 4. Ordering ≤lex on lexically distinct XSD datatypes
Definition 9 (Minimally required datatypes). The set of
minimally required datatypes for a Unicode string w is
the nonempty antichain R ⊆ T of minimal datatypes with
respect to ≤lex such that τ ∈ R =⇒ w ∈ φ(τ), and
τ′ <lex τ =⇒ w < φ(τ′).
Algorithm 1: minLex
Input: lexical datatype system (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
Unicode string w
Output: minimally required datatypes R ⊆ T
1 R := ∅; cand := T
2 for τ in topologicalS ortOrder(T,≤lex) do
3 if cand = ∅ then done
4 else if τ ∈ cand and w ∈ φ(τ) then
5 R := R ∪ {τ}
6 cand := cand \ ↑ τ w.r.t. ≤lex
The minimally required datatypes are computed by in
Algorithm 1 (minLex). The algorithm terminates after |T |
steps in the worst case. Acceptance of a string by a datatype
is checked in topological sort order with respect to ≤lex.
To minimize the number of checks, a candidates set cand
is maintained. If w is in some lexical space, w is also in
all greater datatypes because ≤lex is transitive, and the up-
set can be removed from cand. Furthermore, the topological
order guarantees that the matched datatypes are minimal and
incomparable. Algorithm minLex always returns a nonempty
set because the ⊤ datatype has space U∗ and matches for
encodingLike
structureLike stringLike
⊤
booleanLike
atomicNumericLike
atomicUnsignedLike
listLike
numericLike
temporalLike
Figure 5. Ordering ≤s on kinds of lexical datatypes
any string.
2) Preference Heuristic: Figure 4 already suggests that
lexical spaces of XSD datatypes are often incomparable
and ambiguous. This leads to weird datatype choices, e.g.,
minLex(false) = {language, boolean, NCName}. The an-
tichain is lexically correct, but some datatypes are semanti-
cally more informative and preferred over others. A second
step in datatype inference is therefore to drop the least
informative datatypes from minimally required datatypes.
The proposed heuristic captures the XSD type hierarchy and
datatype semantics in an ordering ≤s for kinds of datatypes.
Figure 5 illustrates the ordering, and kinds are defined as:
stringLike = {string, normalizedString, token, ENTITY, ID,IDREF, NMTOKEN}
listLike = {ENTITIES, IDREFS, NMTOKENS}
structureLike = {anyURI, NOTATION, QName, Name, language, NCName}
encodingLike = {base64Binary, hexBinary}
temporalLike = {gDay, gMonth, gYear, gYearMonth, gMonthDay, date, duration,
time, dayTimeDuration, yearMonthDuration, dateTime, dateTimeStamp}
numericLike = {nonPositiveInteger, nonNegativeInteger, positiveInteger,
decimal, integer, negativeInteger}
atomicNumericLike = {float, double, long, int, short, byte}
atomicUnsignedLike = {unsignedLong, unsignedInt, unsignedShort,
unsignedByte}
booleanLike = {boolean}
There is also a distinguished ⊤ kind for the ⊤ datatype
for upward closure. Algorithm 2 (pre f ) compares pairs of
minimally required datatypes, and if two datatypes are com-
parable with respect to ≤s, the greater datatype is removed
from the set. The resulting set R′ is still an antichain of
datatypes with respect to ≤lex.
3) Datatyped Event Stream for Learning: For learning,
every text in a document event stream needs to be mapped
to its minimally required datatypes:
minReq(w) = pre f (minLex(w)) for string w (1)
dtyped(e) =

minReq(lab(e)) if characters
e for other events
(2)
Algorithm 2: pre f
Input: lexical datatype system (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
datatypes R ⊆ T
Output: preferred datatypes R′ ⊆ T
1 R′ := R
2 for τ, τ′ in R and τ , τ′ do
3 if [τ]∼s <s [τ′]∼s then R′ := R′ \ {τ′}
The learner also needs to be able to aggregate minimally
required datatypes from different text contents. Let v,w be
to strings over Unicode. The minimally required datatypes
that accept both strings are:
minReq(v,w) = max≤lex minReq(v) ∪ minReq(w) (3)
The max≤lex operation guarantees a nonempty antichain
with respect to ≤lex that cover both strings.
Example 2. Let S = {1, 0, true, 33} be Unicode strings,
then minReq(S ) = {boolean, unsignedByte}.
D. The Incremental Learner
A famous result by Gold [27] states that the language
class of unrestricted regular expressions is not learnable in
the limit from positive examples only. This result trans-
lates to dXVPAs because modules characterize regular lan-
guages over types and datatypes. The full language class
of datatyped event streams expressible in dXVPAs can
therefore not be learned from example documents only, and
restrictions are necessary. Two restrictions originating from
schema complexity are considered:
• Simplicity of regular expressions. Bex et al. [31] have
examined 202 DTDs and XSDs and conclude that the
majority of regular expressions in practical schema
productions are simple because types occur only a small
number of times in expressions.
• Locality of typing contexts. Martens et al. [17] have
studied 819 DTDs and XSDs from the web and XML
standards, and typing elements in 98% is local, i.e., the
type of an element only depends on its parent.
To capture simplicity, Bex et al. [32] define the class of
single-occurrence regular expressions (SOREs). In a SORE,
a symbol occurs at most once, and the majority of schema
productions in the wild belong to this class. SOREs gen-
erate a 2-testable regular language, and k-testable regular
languages [33] are known to be efficiently learnable from
positive examples only.
A k-testable regular language is fully characterized by a
finite set of allowed substrings of length k, and learning
is collecting the substrings. This can be done efficiently
by constructing a prefix tree acceptor (PTA), i.e., a DFA
that accepts exactly the examples, and naming the states
according to the string prefixes that lead to them. Merging
tv
(a) preceding(v)
t
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Figure 6. Typing of an element
states whose names share the same (k−1)-length suffix then
generalizes the automaton. This can be done implicitly while
constructing a PTA. The proposed learner utilizes this idea
by embedding typing information in state names that are
derived from prefixes of datatyped event streams.
1) Typing Mechanisms: Typing can be thought of as a
function that determines the type of an element from its
name and other elements in the document [17], [34].
Figure 6 illustrates typing mechanisms by representing
the infoset of a document without text contents and identity
constraints as a tree, where lab(v) is the qualified element
name of node v. Efficient stream processing requires de-
terministic typing, and Martens et al. [17] therefore define
1-pass preorder typing (1PPT): a schema allows 1PPT if
the type of every node v can be determined from the
preceding(v) subtree as shown in Figure 6a. The authors
surprisingly show that typing based on the ancestor-sibling
string anc-lsib-str(v) is sufficient for the 1PPT property.
Let lsib(v) = lab(u1) · · · lab(um) · lab(v) be a left-
sibling string, where u1, . . . , um are the left siblings of
v. The ancestor-sibling string is then anc-lsib-str(v) =
lsib(i1)#lsib(i2)# · · ·#lsib(in) such that i1 is the root node,
in = v, and i j+1 is a child of i j. An example is in Figure 6b.
Element Declaration Consistency (EDC) and Unique Par-
ticle Attribution (UPA) are syntactic restrictions for pro-
ductions in XSD to ensure deterministic typing. These
restrictions are tighter than necessary for the 1PPT property.
In XSD, a node v is typed by the ancestor string anc-str(v)
as shown in Figure 6c. The ancestor string is defined as
anc-str(v) = lab(i1) · lab(i2) · · · lab(in), where i1 is the root
node, in = v, and i j+1 is a child of i j.
2) Incremental Update: Named states in Algorithm 3
(incWeightedVPA) are the foundation for state merging. The
algorithm iterates over document event stream w in a single
pass and returns an updated VPA and counters. In a run, the
algorithm maintains a stack, collects element names, and for
every event, a next state is derived from three state naming
functions with signatures call : Q × Σ → Q, int : Q → Q,
and ret : Q × Q × Σ → Q. A transition is then stored to
connect the current with the next state.
The three functions utilize the discussed typing mecha-
nisms, and two state naming schemes are proposed.
Definition 10 (State naming schemes). A state is a pair (u, v)
Algorithm 3: incWeightedVPA
Input: VPA A = (Q, q0, F, Q, δ) over Σ ⊎ T ⊎ Σ
lexical datatype system (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
state naming functions call, int, ret
counters ωQ, ωF , ωδ
document event stream w
Output: updated VPA A and counters ωQ, ωF , ωδ
1 s := ⊥ // empty stack
2 q := q0 // current state
3 for e in dtyped(w) do
4 switch eventT ype(e) do
5 case startElement do
6 Σ := Σ ∪ {lab(e)}
7 q′ := call(q, lab(e))
8 ωQ(q′) := ωQ(q′) + 1
9 δcall := δcall ∪ {q
lab(e)/q
−−−−−→ q′}
10 ωδ(q
lab(e)/q
−−−−−→ q′) := ωδ(q
lab(e)/q
−−−−−→ q′) + 1
11 s := s · q
12 q := q′
13 case endElement do
14 let vp = s // p is top
15 q′ := ret(q, p, lab(e))
16 ωQ(q′) := ωQ(q′) + 1
17 δret := δret ∪ {q
lab(e)/p
−−−−−→ q′}
18 ωδ(q
lab(e)/p
−−−−−→ q′) := ωδ(q
lab(e)/p
−−−−−→ q′)+1
19 s := v
20 q := q′
21 case characters do
22 q′ := int(q)
23 ωQ(q′) := ωQ(q′) + 1
24 δint := δint ∪ {q
τ
−→ q′ | τ ∈ lab(e)}
25 for τ ∈ lab(e) do ωδ(q τ−→ q′) := ωδ(q τ−→ q′) + 1
26 q := q′
27 F := F ∪ {q}
28 ωF(q) := ωF (q) + 1
of typing context u and left-sibling string v. Symbols # and
$ are a left-sibling separator and a placeholder for text.
• Ancestor-based. A state (u, v) ∈ (Σ∗ × (Σ ∪ {$})∗) is a
pair of ancestor string and left-sibling string.
• Ancestor-sibling-based. A state (u, v) ∈ ((Σ∪ {$, #})∗ ×
(Σ ∪ {$})∗) is a pair of ancestor-sibling string and left-
sibling string.
Initially, the intermediate VPA has a single nonaccepting
start state (ǫ, ǫ), no transitions, and counters are set to zero.
Next states and transitions are created inductively from the
start state, and counters are increased. For learning within the
XSD language class, states must be ancestor based. Beyond
XSD but within the 1PPT language class, states must be
ancestor-sibling based.
3) Local State Merging: Based on Definition 10, every
prefix of every datatyped event stream can characterize a
state. When complete ancestor, ancestor-sibling, and left-
sibling strings are returned by state naming functions in
Algorithm incWeightedVPA, the resulting automaton would
accept exactly the learned documents similar to a PTA
for regular languages. Generalization by state merging is
then embedded in the state naming functions by returning
equivalence classes of named states.
The distinguishing criterion is locality: two states are
equal if they share the same l-local typing context and k-
local left siblings. The refined naming functions are:
intk,l(q) = (π1(q), σk(π2(q) · $)), (4)
retk,l(q, p, e) = (π1(p), σk(π2(p) · lab(e))), (5)
callask,l(q, e) = (σl(π1(q) · lab(e)), ǫ), (6)
callalsk,l ((r1# · · ·#rn, v), e) =
(rn−l+1# · · ·#rn#σk(v · lab(e)), ǫ) (7)
Ancestor- and ancestor-sibling-based naming schemes re-
quire a different call function denoted by superscripts as
and als respectively. The suffix function σi(w) returns the i-
length suffix of sequence w, and πi(x) denotes the ith field of
tuple x. For characters events, intk,l is the same under both
naming schemes; the typing context remains unchanged, and
$ is appended to the left siblings as a placeholder. Using a
placeholder for the next state is sound because of the mixed-
content restrictions in Definition 6. For endElement events,
retk,l is also the same under both naming schemes; the next
state inherits the typing context from stack state p, and a
new left sibling is added to the ones in p. In case of a
startElement event, a new typing context is created, and
left siblings are set to empty.
Parameters k and l specify the hypothesis space of the
learner. For the lower bound k = l = 1, the learnable
language class is a strict subclass of DTD. For l ≥ 1, k = 1,
both state naming schemes produce congruent automata, and
the learnable language class is a strict subclass of XSD.
Greater parameters increase the learnable language class, but
also the state space grows, and more examples are necessary
for convergence. If the true language class is not k-l-local
or when parameters are chosen too small, an approximation
is learned.
4) Generating a dXVPA: The intermediate VPA and its
counters still need to be translated into a dXVPA. Algo-
rithm 4 (trim) creates a new intermediate VPA without zero-
weight states and transitions. Furthermore, trim ensures a
correct antichain of datatypes for internal datatype transi-
tions between two states.
Algorithm 5 (genXVPA) generates a valid dXVPA from
a trimmed intermediate VPA. States are partitioned into
modules based on their typing context. The initial module
m0 is the one called from state (ǫ, ǫ). The call function from
state naming guarantees that the entry of module m is always
Algorithm 4: trim
Input: VPA A = (Q, q0, F, Q, δ) over Σ ⊎ T ⊎ Σ
lexical datatype system (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
counters ωQ, ωF , ωδ
Output: VPA A′ = (Q′, q0, F′ , Q′, δ′)
1 δ
′call := δcall \ {q
c/q
−−→ q′ | ωδ(q
c/q
−−→ q′) = 0}
2 δ
′ret := δret \ {q
c/q
−−→ q′ | ωδ(q
c/q
−−→ q′) = 0}
3 δ
′int := δint \ {q
τ
−→ q′ | ωδ(q τ−→ q′) = 0}
4 δ
′′ int := ∅
5 foreach {(q, q′) | ∃τ.q τ−→ q′ ∈ δ′int} do
6 let R = {τ | q τ−→ q′ ∈ δ′int}
7 δ
′′ int := δ
′′ int ∪ {q
τ
−→ q′ | τ ∈ max≤lex R}
8 δ′ = δ
′call ⊎ δ
′ret ⊎ δ
′′ int
9 Q′ := Q \ {q | ωQ(q) = 0}
10 F′ := F \ {q | ωF(q) = 0}
Algorithm 5: genXVPA
Input: VPA A = (Q, q0, F, Q, δ) over Σ ⊎ T ⊎ Σ
lexical datatype system (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
Output: dXVPA A′ over (Σ, M, µ,T, φ), where
A′ = ({Qm, em, Xm, δm}m∈M,m0, Xm0)
1 M := {u | (u, v) ∈ Q and u , ǫ}
2 m0 := u such that q0
c/q0
−−→ (u, ǫ) ∈ δcall
3 for m ∈ M do
4 Qm := {(u, v) ∈ Q | u = m}
5 em := (m, ǫ)
6 Xm := {q ∈ Qm | q
c/p
−−→ q′ ∈ δret}
7 δcallm := {q
c/q
−−→ q′ ∈ δcall | q ∈ Qm}
8 δintm := {q
τ
−→ q′ ∈ δint | q, q′ ∈ Qm}
9 δretm := {q
c/p
−−→ q′ ∈ δret | q ∈ Qm}
10 δretm := δ
ret
m ∪ {q
c/p
−−→ q′ | q ∈ Xm and ∃qm.qm
c/p
−−→ q′ ∈ δretm }
11 δm = δ
call
m ⊎ δ
call
m ⊎ δ
call
m
12 if ∃q.q
c/q
−−→ em ∈ δ
call then µ(m) := c
13 A′ := minimize(A′)
state (m, ǫ). Return transitions are added to all module exit
states to ensure the single-exit property (Line 10).
Algorithm 6 (minimize) merges congruent modules. Ku-
mar et al. [12] have shown that XVPA modules can be
translated to DFAs, and this construction is extended to
dXVPA modules. The algorithm compares modules m and
n, and if they are reachable by the same element name and
have congruent DFAs, n folds into m by redirecting calls
and returns to corresponding states in m. The state bijection
ϕ follows from bisimulation of the DFAs, and after a fold,
minimize restarts until no fold occurs.
5) Learner Properties: Algorithm 7 assembles the
learner. Incrementally updating an intermediate VPA pre-
vents information loss from premature minimization of
dXVPA modules. For a lexical datatype system, three nam-
Algorithm 6: minimize
Input: dXVPA A over (Σ, M, µ,T, φ), where
A = ({Qm, em, Xm, δm}m∈M,m0, Xm0 )
Output: minimized dXVPA A
1 while ∃m∃n.m, n ∈ M and m , n and µ(m) =
µ(n) and DFAm ≃ DFAn do
2 let ϕ : Qn → Qm // from bisimulation
3 for qn
c/pi
−−→ qi ∈ δretn do
4 δcalli := δ
call
i \ {pi
c/pi
−−→ en} ∪ {pi
c/pi
−−→ em}
5 δretm := δ
ret
m ∪ {xm
c/pi
−−→ qi | xm ∈ Xm}
6 for qn
c/qn
−−→ ei ∈ δ
call
n do
7 δ
′ret
i = ∅
8 for qi
c/p j
−−→ q j ∈ δreti do
9 if j=n then δ′reti :=δ
′ret
i ∪{qi
c/ϕ(p j)
−−−−→ ϕ(q j)}
10 else δ′reti := δ
′ret
i ∪ {qi
c/p j
−−−→ q j}
11 δreti := δ
′ret
i
12 if n = m0 then m0 := m
13 M := M \ {n} // remove module n
14 µ(n) := ∅
ing functions, and parameters k and l, the incremental learner
computes a dXVPA from document event stream w. The
equivalent cXVPA can then check acceptance.
Algorithm 7: Incremental learner
Input: persistent VPA A
lexical datatype system dts = (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
persistent counters ω = (ωQ, ωF , ωδ)
state naming f = (intk,l, callk,l, retk,l) with k, l
document event stream w
Output: dXVPA A′
1 initially, A = ({(ǫ, ǫ)}, (ǫ, ǫ), ∅, {(ǫ, ǫ)}, ∅)
2 A, ω := incWeightedVPA(A, dts, f , ω,w)
3 A′ := genXVPA(trim(A,dts, ω))
Theorem 2. The learner is (1) incremental, (2) set-driven,
(3) consistent, (4) conservative, (5) strong-monotonic, and
identifies a subclass of 1PPT mixed-content XML.
Incremental learning follows from Algorithm 7. A set-
driven learner follows from calling incWeightedVPA re-
peatedly for a set of examples and generating the dXVPA
after the last one. Set-driven learning is insensitive to the
order of presented examples, and this property follows from
state naming and treating states and transitions as sets. A
learner is consistent if all learned examples are accepted,
conservative if a current hypothesis is kept as long as no
contradicting evidence is presented, and strong-monotonic if
the language increases with every example [35], [36]. These
properties follow from updating sets of states and transitions
in the intermediate VPA using the state naming functions.
States and call and return transitions are never deleted, and
new ones are only added when observed. Also, an internal
transition on datatype τ is only removed if a new transition
on τ′ is added, where τ′ covers τ.
A learned dXVPA is always deterministic because of the
restriction to k-l-local 1PPT. Checking acceptance using the
corresponding cXVPA is therefore linear in the length of the
document event stream.
E. Anomaly Detection Refinements
The learning process could be targeted by poisoning [13],
and two operations for dealing with adversarial training data
are proposed.
Algorithm 8: unlearn
Input: VPA A = (Q, q0, F, Q, δ) over Σ ⊎ T ⊎ Σ
lexical datatype system dts = (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
counters ωQ, ωF , ωδ
document event stream w
Output: updated VPA A and counters ωQ, ωF , ωδ
1 s := ⊥ // empty stack
2 q := q0 // current state
3 for e in dtyped(w) do
4 switch eventT ype(e) do
5 case startElement do
6 q′ := δcall(q, lab(e))
7 ωQ(q′) := ωQ(q′) − 1
8 ωδ(q
lab(e)/q
−−−−−→ q′) := ωδ(q
lab(e)/q
−−−−−→ q′) − 1
9 s := s · q
10 q := q′
11 case endElement do
12 let vp = s // p is top
13 q′ := δret(q, lab(e), p)
14 ωQ(q′) := ωQ(q′) − 1
15 ωδ(q
lab(e)/p
−−−−−→ q′) := ωδ(q
lab(e)/p
−−−−−→ q′) − 1
16 s := v
17 q := q′
18 case characters do
19 q′ := δint(q, τ) for some τ ∈ lab(e)
20 ωQ(q′) := ωQ(q′) − 1
21 for τ ∈ lab(e) do ωδ(q τ−→ q′) := ωδ(q τ−→ q′) − 1
22 q := q′
23 ωF(q) := ωF (q) − 1
24 A := trim(A, dts, ωQ, ωF , ωδ)
We distinguish poisoning attacks that are uncovered at
some later time and poisoning attacks that remain hidden but
are statistically rare. Therefore, unlearning removes a once
learned example from the intermediate VPA, and sanitization
trims low-frequent transitions and states.
Algorithm 8 (unlearn) simulates a run on the document
event stream that needs to be forgotten, traverses the inter-
mediate VPA, and decrements counters. The document must
have been learned before at an earlier time for the operation
to be sound.
Algorithm 9: sanitize
Input: VPA A = (Q, q0, F, Q, δ) over Σ ⊎ T ⊎ Σ
lexical datatype system dts = (T, φ,∼s,≤s)
counters ωQ, ωF , ωδ
Output: updated VPA A′ and counters ω′Q, ω′F , ω′δ
1 for any defined transition x do ω′δ(x) := ωδ(x) − 1
2 for q ∈ Q do
3 ω′Q(q) :=
∑
transition x to q ω
′
δ(x)
4 if q ∈ F then ω′F (q) := ω′Q(q)
5 A′ := trim(A, dts, ω′Q, ω′F , ω′δ)
6 let Qu be the unreachable states in A′
7 if Qu , ∅ then
8 if (F′ \ Qu) = ∅ then // revert changes
9 ω′Q := ωQ; ω
′
F := ωF ; ω
′
δ
:= ωδ; A′ := A
10 else // remove unreachable states
11 for q ∈ Qu do
12 for any transition x to q do ω′δ(x) := 0
13 ω′Q(q) := ω′F(q) := 0
14 A′ := trim(A, dts, ω′Q, ω′F , ω′δ)
Algorithm 9 (sanitize) trims low frequent states and tran-
sitions by decrementing all counters. The algorithm has two
stages. First, counters for all transitions are decremented,
and counters of states are recomputed. Second, unreachable
states are identified and decremented to zero for deletion. If
no final state is reachable, all weight counters are restored
because sanitization is not applicable.
It should be stressed that sanitization should only be
applied after a large number of examples have been learned.
The operation violates the consistent, conservative, and
strong-monotonicity properties of the learner. Also, after a
sanitize operation, unlearn becomes unsound.
III. Experimental Evaluation
The proposed approach has been implemented in
Scala 2.11.7, and two aspects of performance are considered:
detection performance and learning progress.
A. Measures
By assuming binary classification between normal and
attack, the following performance measures are computed
from labeled datasets: recall/detection rate (Re), false-
positive rate (FPR), precision (Pr), and F1 for overall per-
formance [37]. Identification in the limit has a convergence
point, but practical convergence can only be estimated by
counting mind changes between incremental steps [38].
Definition 11 (Mind changes). Mind changes MCi are the
number of states and transitions whose counters switched
from zero to one after learning document event stream wi.
Parameters k and l embody a strong combinatorial upper
bound on the number of states and transitions for a finite
number of elements. In the worst case of randomness, con-
vergence is reached when the state space is fully saturated.
B. Datasets
Table I summarizes the four datasets. The learner infers a
dXVPA from training data, and performance is measured by
validating the testing data with the corresponding cXVPA.
Datasets Carsale and Catalog have been synthetically gener-
ated using the stochastic XML generator ToXGene [39]. For
providing a realistic setting, a VulnShopService and a ran-
domized VulnShopClient have been implemented for captur-
ing SOAP messages. This Apache Axis2 1.6.0 SOAP/WS-*
web service uses Apache Rampart 1.6.0 for WS-Security
and provides two service operations: regular shop orders
(dataset VulnShopOrder) and digitally signed shop orders
(dataset VulnShopAuthOrder). For realism, the implemen-
tation strictly followed the Axis2 and Rampart examples.
The business logic utilized Java beans, and Java2WSDL
automatically generated an Axis2 service from beans. Names
for operations and Java classes have been deliberately chosen
to require types in a schema.
Attacks in synthetic datasets were added manually. At-
tacks in the simulated datasets are recordings of actual at-
tacks, e.g., WS-Attacker-1.7 [6] for Denial-of-Service (high
node count, coercive parsing) and signature wrapping.
C. Performance
1) Baseline Performance: Schema validation using
Apache Xerces 2.9.1 established a baseline, and results are
listed in Table II. The schemas for the Carsale and Catalog
datasets were extracted from ToXGene configurations, and
simple types were set to datatype string or more informa-
tive datatypes when applicable. The VulnShopOrder and
VulnShopAuthOrder datasets needed a schema collection
from the web service because of the composed WS-*
standards.
The schemas in synthetic datasets are free from extension
points, and schema validation achieved good performance as
expected. The baseline for the simulated VulnShopService
however illustrated the effect of extension points. Half of
the attacks in VulnShopOrder were identified because of
structural violations or datatype mismatches, but all Denial-
of-Service attacks at extension points passed. Furthermore,
no signature wrapping attack was identified.
2) Detection Performance: Table III summarizes the best
results by the proposed algorithms for lowest parameters k
and l. The best parameters were found in a grid search over
values k, l ∈ {1, . . . , 5} and the two naming schemes.
The proposed language-based anomaly detection approach
outperformed the baseline. No false positives were detected,
and the best results were already achieved with the simplest
parameters, i.e., ancestor-based state naming and k = l = 1.
All structural anomalies caused by attacks were detected.
It should be stressed that k = l = 1 was a good-enough
Table I
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Carsale 50 1000 17 1 3 2 3 2 2 1 3 0
Catalog 100 2000 17 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 0
VulnShopOrder 200 2000 28 2 4 2 5 3 5 3 4 0
VulnShopAuthOrder 200 2000 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 78
Table II
Schema validation baseline performance
Dataset Pr Re FPR F1
Carsale 100% 82.35% 0% 90.32%
Catalog 100% 76.47% 0% 86.67%
VulnShopOrder 100% 50% 0% 66.67%
VulnShopAuthOder undef. 0% 0% undef.
Table III
Best performance using ancestor-based states
Dataset k l Pr Re FPR F1
Carsale 1 1 100% 100% 0% 100%
Catalog 1 1 100% 82.35% 0% 90.32%
VulnShopOrder 1 1 100% 92.86% 0% 96.30%
VulnShopAuthOrder 1 1 100% 100% 0% 100%
approximation of the language to identify attacks, but more
sound types were inferred for l > 1.
Some script and command injection attacks were not
identified. These attacks have in common that exploitation
code appears in texts and use CDATA fields to hide special
characters, e.g., angled brackets and ampersands, from the
XML parser’s lexical analysis. The lexical datatype system
is too coarse in this case because the inferred datatype
normalizedString permits the attack-identifying characters.
3) Learning Progress: Learning progress was measured
in mind changes, and Figures 7a–7d summarize the fastest
converging settings for the four datasets. When converged,
the performance coincided with Table III. In every training
iteration, the learner randomly drew a training document
without replacement for learning, and the validator checked
acceptance of testing data for measuring improvements. Be-
cause of randomness, runs were repeated 15 times, average
values for F1 and FPR were computed, and the error regions
in the plots illustrate minimal and maximal values in the
random learning processes.
The first training example always caused many mind
changes because there were no states and transitions yet.
The strong-monotonicity property guarantees that detection
performance either increases or stays the same after learning
an example and assuming it is not a poisoning attack.
In the real world, detection performance is not observable
but mind changes are. As shown in the figures, mind changes
became less frequent over time, and a long period of zero
mind changes could be a heuristic for convergence.
The quick convergence in Figure 7c and 7d stemmed
from the simplicity of the language automatically generated
by Java2WSDL. The generator only supports sequential
(member variables) and iterating (arrays) productions but no
choice. A few examples were sufficient for finding a good-
enough approximation with small parameters k and l.
4) Unlearning and Sanitization: Unlearning reverses
learning, and Figure 7e illustrates the effects. In this sce-
nario, a successful attacker was able to feed poisoning
attacks to the learner, and performance dropped accordingly.
At a later time, a hypothetical expert identified the poisoning
attacks and started unlearning them. The detection perfor-
mance recovered, and knowledge gained in between attacks
and unlearning remained in the model.
Sanitization trims low-frequent states and transitions. A
single hidden poisoning attack was injected after 10% learn-
ing progress, and there was an impact on performance. After
75% progress, sanitization was performed. Figure 7f shows
the effects of sanitization. In at least one of the 15 trials, the
learner had no stable language representation at the moment
of sanitization. Good knowledge was trimmed, performance
dropped, and more mind changes after sanitization were
necessary to recover again. Knowledge gained from a single
example could be lost by sanitization.
IV. RelatedWork
This work focuses on XML stream validation because
of large documents and open-ended streams (e.g., XMPP).
Stream validation has been introduced by Segoufin and
Vianu [40] using finite-state machines and pushdown au-
tomata. Kumar et al. [12] consider document event streams
as visibly pushdown languages (VPLs), a class of deter-
ministic context-free languages, and the authors propose
XVPAs as a better representation. XVPAs have therefore
been extended with datatypes for text contents.
Schema inference from a set of documents focuses on
finding simple regular expressions for schema productions.
Beyond the expressiveness of DTD, Chidlovskii [41] and
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Mly´nkova´ and Necˇasky´ [42] propose grammar-based ap-
proaches, where infoset tree nodes turned into productions.
These productions are then generalized by determinism
constraints [41] and heuristics [42]. Bex et al. [43] propose
schema inference in terms of tree automata, where up to k
ancestor elements in a document characterize a type. This
work has motivated the use of locality as a generalization
strategy. Lexical subsumption for datatype inference was fist
mentioned by Chidlovskii [41] and Hegewald et al. [44];
however, not all XSD datatypes have been considered. The
proposed approach considers a datatype choice instead of a
single datatype, all distinguishable XSD datatypes are used,
and a preference heuristic refines a choice.
With respect to anomaly detection, Menahem et al. [45]
propose a feature extraction process for documents, so exist-
ing machine-learning algorithms can be reused, but structural
information is lost. A schema is assumed to be available,
and this direction has therefore not been further pursued.
Another anomaly detection approach specifically for tree
structures is based on geometry. Rieck [46] introduces tree
kernels as measures of shared information between two parse
trees. Kernels enable global and local anomaly detection, and
this method could eventually be extended to XML infoset
trees. Global anomaly detection finds a volume-minimal
sphere that encloses the vector-embedded trees, and local
anomaly detection computes kernel-based distances to the
nearest neighbors. Approximate tree kernels [47] are a trade-
off for reducing computational costs. However, this method
assumes a tree which conflicts with streaming requirements.
V. Conclusions
This paper proposes a grammatical inference approach
for learning the accepted language of an XML-based sys-
tem. Schema validation is ineffective as a defense mech-
anism when extension points are present. For language-
based anomaly detection, an automaton is inferred from
examples, so documents with unexpected structure or text
contents can be identified. It is also possible to translate
such an automaton into a schema [12]. The contributions
are dXVPAs as language representations for mixed-content
XML, cXVPAs as an optimization of dXVPAs for efficient
stream validation, algorithms for datatype inference from
text, an incremental learner, and an experimental evaluation
in synthetic and realistic scenarios.
The dXVPAs capture well-nested event streams, i.e.,
linearizations of trees, but no integrity constraints, to stay
within a language class that allows efficient stream valida-
tion. This approach is nevertheless effective as a detection
method because a learned language has no extension points.
Improving the learning setting from k-l-local languages
toward more powerful ones, e.g., by query learning [38],
is a major open research question. Inferring and validating
integrity constraints are also open research questions; how-
ever, Arenas et al. [48] have already shown that this problem
is computationally much harder.
Simple parameters (k = 1, l = 2) for the learner outper-
formed baseline schema validation in experiments; nonethe-
less, there are limitations. Some attacks in experiments could
not be identified because lexical spaces of XSD datatypes are
too coarse. Introducing more fine-grained datatypes would
improve the detection rate. Also, repetitions are not bounded,
and an order on unordered attributes is assumed. Repetition
bounds and unordered attributes are two additional open
research questions.
Finally, the unlearning and sanitization operations help
to deal with adversarial training data, but the operations
only apply after a poisoning attack has happened. The
experiments indicated that the momentum of mind changes
in the learning progress could be a heuristic for identifying
a poisoning attack automatically while it is learned.
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